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In the last 30 years, in the light of a series of new European Union treaties,
thousands of lobbyists have flocked to Brussels, drawn by the increasing
importance of EU-level decision making. Today on average 30–40 per cent of
all national laws and regulations in the 27 EU Member States derive from EU
rules and legislation; for environmental issues, it is more than 60 per cent.1
Lobbying is usually defined as seeking to influence legislation, policy, or
regulation, usually in return for payment. A narrow understanding of lobbying
focuses solely on direct representations by pressure groups to legislators. A wider
and more realistic definition includes the different forms of communication and
research activity that underpin, inform, and support the preparation of policy
proposals before lobbyists put them to legislators and decision makers.
From the mid-1980s corporate lobbyists began to take an increasingly close
interest in what the EU was doing, and how they could influence it. In 1985
there were reportedly 654 lobbyists in Brussels.2 This figure continued to grow
and by 1992 it was estimated that more than 3,000 public and economic
lobbies were active in Brussels.3 It is said that over 15,000 lobbyists are
currently active influencing the EU institutions, most of them from offices in
the four square kilometres around the European Commission headquarters
and the European Parliament, the so-called European Quarter.4 Brussels now
vies with Washington for the title of lobbying capital of the world.
The vast majority of the Brussels lobbyists work on behalf of business
interests. Citizens’ groups and public-interest lobbies, on the other hand, are
surprisingly thin on the ground. One estimate suggests that corporate
lobbyists outnumber public-interest groups by a factor of five to one.5
1
brussels – a lobbying paradise? 
William Dinan, Spinwatch and Erik Wesselius, 
Corporate Europe Observatory
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Corporate lobbyists also have much more money at their disposal. While public-
interest lobbies can benefit from the positive reputation of their organisations
and the commitment of their staff, they are generally fighting an uphill battle.
The uneven playing field between those lobbying for commercial interests
versus the defenders of wider public interests is further skewed by the
privileged access to decision makers that big business lobbyists enjoy. As a
result, EU directives, regulations and other policy initiatives are often weakened
by industry’s lobbying power, as documented elsewhere in this volume.
The Brussels lobby scene is populated by a bewildering variety of different
organisations and individuals who engage in lobbying activities. Most of them
are so-called ‘in-house lobbyists’, who are employed by corporations or other
organisations like trade associations6, charities, and NGOs. In-house lobbyists
represent their employer’s interests to policy makers and regulators. They
often cooperate with hired consultants, who work for a fee on behalf of a
multiplicity of clients. Hired consultants usually work for specialist lobbying
consultancy firms (often part of multinational public relations firms) or are
lawyers working in the public affairs departments of large commercial law
firms. The complexity of lobbying today means that we need to also factor in
the role of media, public relations, and think tanks when analysing how
pressure and influence are brought to bear on decision making.
Brussels has over 1,500 professional associations, representing almost every
industry imaginable, ranging from the small Brussels office of the European
Envelope Manufacturers Association7 to the 150 staff in the headquarters of
the European chemical industry federation (CEFIC).8 Hundreds of public affairs
firms are active in Brussels, big names like APCO, Burson-Marsteller, Hill &
Knowlton, GPlus and Weber Shandwick, alongside smaller lesser-known
consultancies such as Creative Strategies and the Polit Bureau.9 Together they
employ over a thousand ‘hired-gun’ lobbyists who will work for any industry
or company that can afford to pay them. In addition there are hundreds of
‘EU affairs’ offices run by transnational corporations, and numerous think
tanks, often heavily dependent on corporate funding.
This lobbyists’ web provides a complex political echo chamber for pro-
corporate messages to influence Brussels’ decision makers. The receptions
and policy seminars organised by these groups, their publications, brochures,
and policy papers all help to reinforce and repeat business-friendly messages
in policy discussions. The scale of the propaganda effort (in terms of outlets,
volume, and access to key officials and politicians) helps to cement the impact
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of big business ideas and interests on decision making in Europe.
Despite its extent, there is still no meaningful transparency around lobbying of
the EU. The launch of the European Transparency Initiative in 2005 (see Chapter
13) sparked much debate about lobbying disclosure but to date it has largely
failed to make this vital aspect of the political process visible or accountable.
The Commission’s current voluntary register includes less than one third of
the thousands of groups and firms that are lobbying the EU.10 The information
in the register on lobbying expenses is incomplete and unreliable. Owing to
the continued secrecy surrounding EU lobbying, enforced by the weak
transparency system, it is simply impossible to know how much any
organisation is spending on lobbying the EU institutions in any year. It is also
impossible to tell precisely which issues organisations are lobbying on, or
indeed, who is actually doing the lobbying. These vital ingredients for lobbying
transparency are not included in the EU lobbying register. An industry insider
estimated in 2005 that the annual turnover of corporate lobbying in Brussels
was between €750 million and €1 billion.11 In Washington, where there are
slightly more lobbyists than in Brussels, expenditure on lobbying amounted
to $2.43 billion in 2005, rising to $ 3.47 billion (€2.6 billion) in 2009.12
Lobbyists in the European system – a brief overview
A political reality has emerged within the EU institutions where professional
lobbyists play a far greater role than they do in any of the EU Member States.
While there is certainly a legitimate role for lobbying, EU lobbying risks
becoming simply a vehicle for the capture of politics by commercial interests.
At the EU level, government of, for, and by the people has been quietly eclipsed
by private interactions between professional power brokers and decision
makers, who often have very little contact with, or interest in, mere voters.
One of the reasons why this system has developed is the absence of a genuine
pan-European public debate and the relative weakness of European civil
society networks and social movements at the EU level.
Lobbyists seeking to influence EU legislation usually make the Commission
their starting point: only the Commission can initiate new EU legislation and
it plays a key role in the implementation of existing EU law. The relatively
small size of the Brussels’ administration is one of the reasons that
Commission officials rely so heavily on outside ‘experts’ in drafting policy
proposals and legislation. The entire European Commission employs
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approximately 25,000 staff, with as many as a third of these in secretarial and
translation posts. To fill gaps in its expertise, the Commission runs more than
1,000 advisory groups, many of which are crowded with industry
experts/lobbyists (see Chapter 6). The Commission has in recent years faced
criticism for granting privileged access to industry lobbyists, but has refused
to acknowledge this as a major problem.
The Commission’s close relationship with business dates back to the early
1980s when then Commission President Jacques Delors entered a strategic
partnership with the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), a lobby group
composed of top executives from Europe’s largest corporations.13 The ERT was
founded with the express intention of creating a business-led Marshall Plan for
Europe. It teamed up with Delors to lobby EU governments to support the
creation of a single European market and the ceding of decision-making powers
to Brussels in order to make Europe more competitive and business-friendly.
The Commission sets the political tone and temperature in Brussels. Its
powers mean that it can influence politics and policy throughout the
European Union, although member states still have national autonomy in
interpreting EU directives. The Commission has shown itself repeatedly to be
open to lobbying by business, preferring cosy consultations with corporations
to the rather more fraught negotiations with other social interests: in effect
big business has a privileged seat at the Commission’s table, while public
interests (such as trade unions, environmental concerns, and other civil
society interests) are under-represented and frequently excluded.
The Council of Ministers, made up of the governments of the 27 Member
States of the EU, approves each piece of EU legislation, and is acknowledged
as perhaps the most unaccountable of the EU institutions. National
associations and individual companies often target the Council of Ministers
by lobbying their member-state governments. Sometimes such efforts are
coordinated on an EU-wide basis. As a result of such lobbying, national
ministers or their civil servants often act as the mouthpiece for powerful
corporate interest(s), presenting it as a ‘national interest’ when involved in
intergovernmental negotiation in Brussels.
The European Parliament is important, not simply because it is the only
directly elected EU institution, but because in recent years its powers have
grown significantly. On many issues it now has the power to approve, block,
or adapt proposals coming from the Commission, comparable in some ways
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to the role of the Council of Ministers. The Parliament has therefore attracted
a growing number of lobbyists, with some 4,500 now holding access badges
for the Parliament – the equivalent of six lobbyists for each MEP.
Former EU Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel recently called the European
Parliament a “lobbying paradise”.14 One German MEP described his daily
experience of lobbyists: “They phone me, they pick me up downstairs, they
write me a hundred letters a day. It is not possible to get from here to the
entrance and not see any lobbyists”.15 In 2004 a lobbyists’ association
complained to the parliamentary authorities that its members sometimes
had to stand when they attended parliamentary committee meetings, as a
result of the numbers involved.16 The European Parliament buildings are
enormous but they are still not big enough to accommodate the thousands
of accredited lobbyists roaming the corridors of power.
An indication of the level of lobbying pressure to which MEPs are exposed can
be found buried in an annexe to the resolution on the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS), adopted by the European Parliament in 2008.17 In an
unprecedented move, Avril Doyle, the MEP leading the work (known as the
rapporteur) published a list of the 168 lobbies that had contacted her on the
issue. Doyle said she felt industry-generated pressure firsthand, but not only
from lobbyists: her own party colleagues who had also been lobbied put
pressure on her as rapporteur.18 This lobbying also had a national dimension.
Jo Leinen, chair of the Parliament’s Environment, Public Health, and Food
Safety Committee described how industry pressure was exerted across
Europe: “The German government, the French government, the British
government – they’ve all been lobbied like hell”.19
In February 2009 Slovenian Liberal Democrat MEP Mojca Drčar Murko
highlighted the role of pharmaceutical industry lobbyists during the EU’s so-
called ‘Great Apes Debate’ on animal testing. In a dramatic move, Murko
distanced herself from the resolution on animal testing for which she was
responsible as rapporteur after the Parliament’s Environment Committee
rejected almost all her proposals aimed at reducing the suffering of apes in
scientific laboratories. Pharma lobbyists played a major role in this outcome.
Murko observed: “A lot of colleagues were repeating the same arguments I
heard all the time from the research community and pharmaceutical industry
– the same arguments, and even the same words”.20 In protest Murko voted
against the committee’s conclusions and openly distanced herself from them
in a letter to the committee’s chair.
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A recent study21 analysed amendments submitted to the Parliament on the
regulation of climate-destabilising F-gases and on the REACH system for
registration and testing of chemicals. In both cases a lot of the amendments
were either identical, or very similar to, industry lobbying position papers. On
REACH the research revealed that well over 50 per cent of the amendments
tabled by the conservative EPP-ED group on the relevant committees “could
be traced back to a lobby source”, mainly from the chemical industry.22 Many
of the amendments tabled by EPP-ED MEPs “used identical wording to that
of a lobby group”. While the study shows that the chemical industry lobby
had the biggest influence on the EPP-ED group, members from several other
parties also tabled industry-inspired amendments.
Parliamentarians have become dangerously reliant on the information and
‘help’ on offer from lobbyists. As is the case with the Commission (with its
very limited internal research capacity), so too the Parliament relies on advice
and information from outside organisations. This represents a massive
opportunity for lobbyists with the resources and interest to influence decision
making by ‘subsidising’ the work of officials and MEPs in their preparation
and scrutiny of legislation.
David versus Goliath
Industry lobbyists generally outnumber and outspend public-interest
campaigners in Brussels. In his book about his experiences as an MEP, Jens Holm
describes the debate over the revision of the Cosmetics Directive.23 The main lobby
player on this issue was COLIPA, representing companies like Colgate Palmolive,
L’Oréal, Procter & Gamble, Unilever, and Chanel. COLIPA employs 20 full-time staff
at their Brussels offices, in addition to a number of hired consultants. At the
European consumers’ lobby BEUC, only one person works on cosmetics issues. As
Holm points out, “she is certainly capable, but against 20 fulltime lobbyists and
contracted consultants the playing field is obviously unequal”. Cosmetics are just
one example. The chemical industry lobby group CEFIC employs around 150
people in Brussels. The car lobby is estimated to employ more than 75 full-time
lobbyists in Brussels. Lobbyists for the financial services, energy, and
pharmaceuticals industries are among the most heavily represented sectors.
In the field of financial services, the imbalance has been particularly striking.
In the midst of the financial crisis and the huge public bail-out of the banking
industry, financial services lobbyists have mobilised to resist regulation and
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scrutiny of their activities. Barely a week passes in Brussels without the
opportunity for MEPs and officials to attend an event where they can hear
the perspective of the financial services industry on the financial crisis and
its preferred policy responses. There has been virtually no public-interest lobby
to counter the constant pressure from the lobby of banks, hedge funds,
insurers, and other financial industries.24
In the debate about (the lack of) transparency around EU lobbying, commercial
lobbyists have fought against disclosing what they spend on lobbying. José
Lalloum, who chairs the European lobbying consultancies’ association EPACA,
claimed that such financial information was only useful to “under-employed
journalists [to] prove one thing or another”. He said it was “very dangerous” to
focus on the money spent by lobbyists and that “linking money with influence
sends the wrong message”.25 It is not hard to imagine why those with superior
financial means downplay the importance of money. Money does not always
determine the outcome of lobbying battles, but financial clout clearly counts. 
Looking at lobbying on EU climate policy, Norwegian researcher Anne Therese
Gullberg found that the imbalance in resources between business and public-
interest groups has serious impacts.26 Business lobbies use their human and
financial resources to engage in more comprehensive and prolonged lobbying
than could environmental groups. Whereas environmental lobbies (often due
to limited resources) mainly lobby decision makers with positions similar to their
own, business groups target both ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. Environmental groups are
forced to prioritise and focus on influencing key policy decisions, whereas
business organisations are able to also invest in more long-term, general
lobbying. This more general approach aims not only to set the agenda but also
to frame the thinking about which policy options are feasible and which are not.
Gullberg points out that lobbying at the EU level requires more resources than
at national level because it is difficult to attract attention given the number of
different lobbyists and volume of lobbying activity in Brussels.27 While strategic
lobbying is important, the study finds that “strategy is not enough because
resources decide which strategies can realistically be pursued”. In the case of
climate policy, influence depends on having sufficient knowledge about the
process as well as a network of contacts among decision makers. Such resources
are costly and time-consuming, putting big business at an advantage.
Lobbying in Brussels is frequently described as being softer and more
consensus-seeking than the aggressive approaches sometimes found in
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Washington. Lobby consultants in Brussels like to compare the EU quarter to
a harmonious village where everyone looks after one another. June O’Keefe
from the lobbyists’ lobby group SEAP argued: “In the small Brussels village
reputation is everything.”28 But this cannot justify the industry’s rejection of
transparency and is in any case unconvincing. Likening Brussels to a quaint
“small village” obscures the high stakes and far-reaching consequences of the
decisions being made. Policy decisions in Brussels affect 500 million citizens,
most of whom feel uninformed about EU decision making. The lobbying
community in Brussels is utterly unaccountable to the wider EU public.
The lobbyists’ benign and Panglossian versions of reality inside the Brussels
bubble are at odds with a rather more candid assessment offered by EU
lobbying veteran Daniel Guéguen. He has predicted that the Brussels
influence industry will become more ruthless. “I think we are moving towards
tougher lobbying strategies, towards more sophisticated approaches to
economic intelligence that will probably involve practices such as
manipulation, destabilisation or disinformation,” he said.29
For-profit lobbyists often claim that Brussels hasn’t seen any major lobbying
scandals, as have been seen in the USA30, suggesting this shows there is no need
for mandatory transparency and ethics rules for lobbyists. But in a poll
conducted in 200631, some 40 per cent of lobbyists polled indicated they
thought a lobbying scandal could happen in Brussels unless measures were
taken to avoid it. US scandals came to light as a result of transparency rules,
and similar abuses in Brussels may well remain hidden. Is Brussels really an
idyllic village full of conscientious lobbyists, or are manipulation, destabilisation,
and disinformation the order of the day? At least with some system for
compelling lobbyists to disclose their activities, budgets, and clients there is a
much greater likelihood that malpractice can be identified and addressed.
Mandatory lobbying disclosure is a powerful means of informing citizens about
the conduct of government and making the legislative process more
accountable. When US courts forced the major tobacco companies to publish
millions of internal documents, researchers were able to see evidence of the
lobbying and PR strategies used by the industry to manipulate science and
politics. One revealing story tells how a leading Brussels think tank, the European
Policy Centre (EPC), helped British American Tobacco (BAT) and its corporate allies
to fundamentally change “the way in which all EU policy is made by making a
business-oriented form of IA [Impact Assessment] mandatory”.32 The result was
an increased likelihood that the EU would produce policies that advanced the
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interests of major corporations, including those whose products are damaging
to human health. Think tanks are usually thought of as independent research
institutes that specialise in policy development and analysis. However, most of
the think tanks in Brussels are highly dependent on corporate funding and many
engage more in advocacy than independent research (see Chapter 4). The
researchers found that the European Policy Centre in the mid-1990s helped set
up a Risk Assessment Forum, which brought together a range of large
corporations to build “a large reservoir of informed and favourable opinion
towards the project across the EU”. A key part of the project was to ensure that
policy makers could not use the precautionary principle in legislation and would
instead use impact assessments as a means of evaluating proposals.
Conclusion
The power and procedures of the European institutions, their reliance on
outside advice and information, coupled with almost non-existent rules and
regulations, make Brussels a lobbyists’ paradise. There is no proper oversight
or scrutiny of lobbying and there is a shortage of investigative journalists and
inquisitive media in the Brussels bubble. All this combines to allow lobbyists
to go about their business unfettered by any concerns for public
accountability. The result is anti-democratic because those who can spend
most on lobbying have the best chance to influence EU decisions.
The only way to begin to get to grips with this democratic deficit is the
introduction of a mandatory lobbyists register –but transparency alone is not a
panacea to the problems associated with lobbying in Brussels. Examples
described throughout this book show how corporate interests regularly use
questionable lobbying tactics like scaremongering, flawed impact studies, delay
tactics, deception and misinformation, and the use of front groups and third
parties to advance corporate interests in policy and legislation. The privileged
access and influence enjoyed by big business remains a key problem. These are
symptoms of a political culture adrift, lacking a participative and engaged public.
ALTER-EU has consistently promoted an emphasis on ethics and the integrity
of public life. We believe that robust rules and regulations regarding lobbying
and ethics are needed to secure the probity of the EU system. The culture and
assumptions that currently dominate the Brussels bubble are simply not fit
for purpose – assuming that the purpose is not simply the corporate capture
of EU decision making.
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